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Abstract: Starting from the traditional distinc-
tion between the minimal and the maximal 
division, the role of subcategories in Aristotle, 
as well as that of the highest categories, is 
discussed. The need for categorial properties 
which determine categories is pointed out. 
It is argued that an existent cannot have two 
such essential properties and that only the 
lowest subcategories have simple categorial 
properties. Furthermore, it is emphasised that 
categories and subcategories must form a tree 
because they belong to a theory of categories 
which requires unity. By contrast, it is held that 
the hierarchy of all concepts need not form a 
tree. The diffi culties Porphyrius and Simplicius 
fi nd in Aristotle’s minimal and maximal division 
are analysed. Finally, Aristotle’s way of avoiding 
categorial properties by referring to an abstrac-
tion is criticised.
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Resumen: El artículo discute el papel tanto de 
las categorías supremas como el de las subca-
tegorías a partir de la tradicional distinción aris-
totélica entre una división mínima y una división 
máxima del ente. Señala que para determinar 
las categorías son necesarias las propiedades 
categoriales. Se argumenta que un existente no 
puede poseer dos propiedades esenciales de tipo 
categorial, mientras que solo las subcategorias 
más bajas en la escala poseen propiedades ca-
tegoriales simples. Se señala, además, que las 
categorias y las subcategorias se organizan en 
un árbol según una cierta unidad y que, por el 
contrario, los conceptos no se jerarquizan  ne-
cesariamente formando un árbol. También se 
analizan las difi cultades que Porfi rio y Simplicio 
encontraron en la división mínima y máxima de 
Aristóteles. Finalmente, el artículo critica el modo 
en que Aristóteles evita, a través de la abstrac-
ción, la referencia a las propiedades categoriales.
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0. THE ISSUES
n Aristotle’s book Categoriae there is a minimal division of all 
existents into two categories, namely substances and accidents 
and a maximal division into ten categories, namely primary sub-
stances, secondary substances, quantities, relations, qualities, places, 
times, states, actions, and affections. Why this two-fold division and 
how do the two divisions go together? The latter are subcategories 
of the former. Thus the question is again why categories as well as 
subcategories are needed. Wouldn’t the subcategories suffi ce?
Since categories are classes and since, obviously, they are not 
merely enumerative classes but rather extensions there arises the 
need for categorial properties of which the categories are exten-
sions. Moreover, a clash between the categorial properties threatens 
because existents are necessarily members of the upper categories 
as well as of their subcategories. Categorial properties should be 
necessary properties and such properties have to be very closely con-
nected. That poses the question whether an existent can have more 
than one categorial property and if not whether the maximal and 
the minimal division are compatible or how they can be reconciled. 
Thus, the question is also whether it is even consistent to advocate 
both a minimal and a maximal division.
The minimal division has a problematic entailment if it is taken 
to be the highest level of the categorial hierarchy. It entails that 
there is no top and thus no categorial tree but rather a categorial 
forest with several trees. The maximal division is the lowest catego-
rial division and thus the borderline between categorial and non-
categorial division. Therefore the question arises why to draw the 
borderline there and not somewhere else.
I should make clear that the paper does not offer a detailed 
historical representation but rather a rational and systematic recon-
struction of the project of a theory of categories as a hierarchy of 
classifi cations. The most infl uential conception of this project origi-
nated from Aristotle. The following discussion revolves around the 
constraints of classifi cational hierarchies (also called “Porphyrian 
Trees”).
I
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1. CLASS HIERARCHIES
Consider a very simple class hierarchy. The class of triangles 
is subdivided into equilateral and scalene triangles. Thus the classes 
of equilateral and scalene triangles are subclasses of the class of tri-
angles. One can represent that in a tree graph which visualises the 
talk of a hierarchy. The branches of the tree (mathematicians say 
“edges”1) are formed by the subclass relation. Now, the designations 
of the classes refer to certain properties which its members have. I 
hold that classes normally are determined by properties. Which are 
the properties determining the three classes of our example? The 
upper class of the hierarchy seems is determined by the property 
of having three angles. That is what the designation “triangle” im-
plies. The lower classes are presumably determined by the conjunc-
tive property of having three angles and of having sides of the same 
length and by the conjunctive property of having three angles and of 
having sides of differing length. Obviously, the lower properties con-
tain the higher properties as conjunctive parts. Thus the branches 
of the tree graph can also be interpreted as part relations between 
properties and the vertices of the tree would then be the proper-
ties determining the classes. Furthermore, all the lower properties 
would be conjunctive properties. Only the highest property could 
be a simple one. Thus we would, strictly speaking, have two tree 
graphs which are congruent: a tree graph of classes and a tree graph 
of properties. They would be rather small trees and they would not 
be trees of categories. But they can possibly be integrated into a huge 
tree encompassing all kinds. The top area of that tree would be oc-
cupied by categories. The size of the top area is variable depending 
on the respective ontology. It might be only the highest vertex and a 
two-fold division below or it might comprise more levels of vertices 
and longer chains of edges. The huge and all-encompassing tree has 
traditionally been called the ”Porphyrian Tree”.
Like in any tree graph there are no circles in a Porphyrian tree, 
i.e., if one moves down one will not return to any vertex. Although 
1. See for example G. CHARTRAND, Introductory Graph Theory (Dover, New York, 
1985).
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branches (edges) run only vertically the graph not only shows sub-
ordination and superordination but also co-ordination of vertices. 
Vertices on the same level and subordinated to the same next upper 
vertex are said to be co-ordinated. Co-ordinated vertices form clas-
sifi cations together and thus it holds that the respective classes are 
disjunct (i.e. they don’t have any members in common) while their 
union class is identical with the class of the next superordinate ver-
tex. As a consequence it holds that co-ordinate categories always 
form a classifi cation together. Thus co-ordinate categories exclude 
each other, i.e., they imply the negation of each other. Substance 
and accident in Aristotelianism, for example, are co-ordinate cat-
egories and it is assumed that a substance cannot be an accident and 
an accident cannot be a substance. If they form a categorial classifi -
cation together, then it follows also that any existent must be either 
a substance or an accident.
2. CATEGORIES AND DEFINITIONS
The above paragraph contains the view that categories are classes 
and that they are determined by properties. The view is not exactly 
Aristotle’s but it is a clear view and it allows explicating and discuss-
ing Aristotle’s view. The properties which determine the categories 
will because of their role be called “categorial properties”. A subcat-
egory is subclass of the category of which it is subcategory. Looking 
at a Porphyrian Tree one realises that a subcategory is subcategory 
of exactly one category while a category has always more than one 
subcategory if it has subcategories at all. Obviously not all categories 
can have subcategories. There must be lowest subcategories. 
As to the categorial properties of which the categories are the 
extensions there is also a part-whole relation between the categorial 
property of a subcategory and the category of which it is subcat-
egory. Naturally, this part-whole relation is different from the sub-
class relation. It is based on the conjunction of properties. Moving 
down from a category to a subsequent subcategory one property 
is added in terms of conjunction to the categorial property of the 
superordinate category. Thus the conjunctions of properties get 
longer and longer if one moves downward. 
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By the addition of a property the resulting subcategorial prop-
erty becomes more specifi c than the superordinate categorial prop-
erty. The way down the Porphyrian Tree is not only a way from 
class to subclass and from shorter to longer conjunctive properties 
but it is also a way of specifi cation and of increasing specifi city. The 
longer conjunctive properties are more specifi c than the shorter 
conjunctive properties in a chain of branches (edges) down the tree 
graph. That is visible by the categories (i.e. classes) themselves, 
which become smaller and smaller when one moves down the tree 
on a branch (edge) chain. Obviously, a limit would be reached if a 
category had only one member. Then it would be maximally spe-
cifi c. But I would argue that a category need not be a one-member 
category to be maximally specifi c and that specifi city is to be attrib-
uted primarily to categorial properties.
The chain of specifi cation of the categorial properties by add-
ing and conjoining a property reminds, of course, of Aristotle’s 
method of defi nition designed to place a category or another sort 
of existent in the Porphyrian Tree by indicating its genus proxi-
mum and then adding a differentia specifi ca. Yet Aristotle does 
not admit properties which determine categories at the top of the 
Porphyrian Tree. Rather, he holds that only what is placed at the 
lowest vertices of the Porphyrian Tree (hence the maximally spe-
cifi c) exists while the higher vertices are mere concepts formed 
by us by abstracting and indeterminately representing concreta 
placed at the lowest vertices.2
Moving down a Porphyrian tree from one vertex to the next 
one goes from a less specifi c to a more specifi c property, which is 
a specifi cation of the upper property. Continuing to go down one 
fi nally arrives at a maximally specifi c property. There are specifi ca-
tion chains from the uppermost property to the maximally specifi c 
properties. There are more than one maximally specifi c proper-
ties but they are all specifi cations of the uppermost property. In 
a Porphyrian Tree there is only one uppermost property and it is 
the least specifi c of all. It could be described also as the maximally 
unspecifi c property. In most ontologies it is the property of being 
2. ARISTOTLE, Categoriae, 4f; Topica I/8; Metaphysica, M 4.
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an existent but in Brentano, for example, it is the property of being 
a thing.3
A Porphyrian Tree is a structure. It shows a number of catego-
ries in their relations and it thereby characterises a category struc-
turally, i.e., by its position in the structure, by its being related with 
respect to specifi cation to certain other properties. Therefore, each 
category must occupy only one position or, in other words, it must 
occupy only one vertex of the tree. It is an important principle of 
a Porphyrian Tree that a property has only one position in it and 
that it must not occupy more than one vertex. Call it the “Position 
Principle”.
The highest property of a Porphyrian Tree plays a crucial role. 
From it all chains of specifi cation start and it connects them all. 
Without it we would not have a tree but rather what the mathema-
ticians call a “forest” which lacks unity and connectedness. Some 
scholars take Aristotle to deny that there is a highest category and to 
claim that there are several such categories. That would entail that 
there is no Porphyrian Tree but only a Porphyrian forest consisting 
of several trees. I think Aristotle is well aware of the need for a con-
nected and united Porphyrian Tree. Even in Categoriae there is one 
central category and in Metaphysica the individual substance with 
its essence is also the proper existent (ousia). The proper existent is 
reasonably understood to be the only existent.
Now, most ontologies have not only categories but also subcat-
egories. Thus, there is not only the highest category but additional 
categories on lower levels which have been characterised above as 
subcategories. However, subcategories are also categories. They are 
categories which are subclasses of other categories. Where there 
are several levels of subcategories one can distinguish between im-
mediate and mediate subcategories. The highest categories are, of 
course, not also subcategories.
Why do ontologists use not only categories but also subcatego-
ries? The question is all the more urgent since (as we shall see in §6) 
subcategories leads into a certain diffi culty which would not arise 
with only one category and no subcategories. It seems that there is 
3. F. BRENTANO, Kategorienlehre (Meiner, Leipzig, 1923).
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no tree-theoretic reason for having subcategories. Presumably, it is 
just that more than one category is required to furnish an adequate 
ontological analysis of all the phenomena which are the domain of 
ontology such as existence, diversity, qualitative equality and differ-
ence, complexity, relation, necessity and possibility.
3. THE MINIMAL DIVISION
From each vertex of a tree graph at least two connections lead down-
ward. As was mentioned already, they are part-whole relations in 
Porphyrian trees between classes and between the properties which 
determine the classes. At the top of the Porphyrian tree the classes 
are categories. As was also mentioned, the immediate subcategories 
of a category are disjunct part classes of the category which jointly 
exhaust the category, i.e., their union is identical with the category. 
Therefore the subcategories of a category together can be charac-
terised as a division of the category. The category is divided by the 
immediate subcategories into part-classes. That is what is meant 
when Aristotle’s commentators Porphyrius and Simplicius refer to a 
minimal and a maximal division.4 The minimal division is the small-
est group of immediate subcategories of the top category5 and the 
maximal division is the biggest group of subcategories which are the 
lowest categories in the Porphyrian tree. They have a problem with 
his categories of substance (ousia) and accident (symbebekos) as they 
are introduced in Aristotle’s Categoriae. They argue that it is not a 
correct minimal division, i.e., substance and accident cannot be two 
co-ordinated categories in a Porphyrian tree, because a substance is 
a substance either by being a particular or by being a general sub-
stance, (i.e., a genus). Thus, they conclude that the respective mini-
mal division should have four rather than two categories, namely 
the categories of particular substance, general substance, particular 
4. PORPHYRY, On Aristotle’s Categories (Cornell UP, Ithaca/New York, 1992) 71/1 
and SIMPLICIUS, On Aristotle’s Categories, vol. 1/4 (Cornell UP, Ithaca/ New York 
2003) 67/1.
5. I have to mention that Porphyry and Simplicius seem to think of the minimal 
division as the highest top of the forest of categories. As can be gathered from 
the discussion of §2 that seems to me unsatisfactory.
ERWIN TEGTMEIER
402 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 47/2 (2014) 395-411
accident, and general accident. The argument of Porphyrius and 
Simplicius is clearly not sound. It leads to the absurd consequence 
that only the maximally specifi c properties are categories because 
it can be applied again and again until the bottom of the tree is 
reached. The conclusion is absurd since categories have to be on 
the upper levels of the tree. However, the conclusion accords in way 
with the Aristotelian view mentioned above that only the maximally 
specifi c is real while the higher levels are mere abstractions.
Nevertheless, Porphyrius and Simplicius have a point. Aristotle 
uses in Categoriae a fourfold table. To transfer its content into a 
Porphyrian tree requires the formation of four categories by com-
bining the categories of substance and accident and particular and 
general. That would be a breach of the Position Principle explained 
above that no category is allowed to occur twice in a tree and to oc-
cupy more than one position in it. As subcategory of the category 
of substance and also of the category accident the category of par-
ticular would take two positions. The same is true of the category 
of general. Such a breach of the Position Principle would not occur 
if there were instead Porphyrius’ and Simplicius four co-ordinated 
categories of particular substance, general substance, particular ac-
cident, and general accident.
It should be noted that what Porphyrius and Simplicius call 
“the minimal division” cannot be the top of the Porphyrian tree. 
A division is a group of co-ordinated subcategories. A tree needs 
an undivided top to give it connectedness and unity. However, 
Porphyrius’ and Simplicius’ argument would apply not only to a 
two-category division but also to the highest category (for exam-
ple, the category of existents) at the top of the Porphyrian tree. It 
would lead to the exclusion and elimination of any highest category. 
Without the top vertex we would, in the terminology of mathemati-
cal graph theory, not have a tree but a forest. In other words, the 
tree of categories would lack connectedness and unity. 
However, since Porphyrius’ and Simplicius’ argument is not 
sound there is no impediment to assume one highest category. 
Many scholars take Aristotle to reject a highest category. I think that 
it can be disputed. His term of “ousia” must be translated as “proper 
existent”. That might be the highest category, at least in Aristotle’s 
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Metaphysica where in book Z it is claimed that there can be defi ni-
tion and division only for substances (ousiai). Even in Categoriae the 
fi rst substance (the particular) is taken to be the primary category 
which is to a certain degree equivalent with its placement at the top 
of the Porphyrian tree. 
If the assumption of most Aristotle scholars is true that 
Categoriae is an earlier work and that Metaphysica was written by the 
mature Aristotle he moved to the acceptance of one highest category 
and thus returned to a position close to Socrates and Plato. Anyway, 
the view of Metaphysica Z that the nature (eidos) of a particular is the 
proper being (ousia) strikes one as defi nitely Platonic. It implies an 
abandonment of the particulars (prote ousiai) of the Categoriae and a 
reconception of the kinds (deutero ousiai).
Contemporary metaphysicians who take category theory seri-
ously, also have a hard time to fi nd a single top category and uphold 
a categorial tree. However, Gustav Bergmann had in the ontology 
of his middle period even a simple categorial essence for the top 
category of entities (existents). He called it “existence”.6 The Later 
Bergmann has dropped existence and even uses the term “entities”, 
which is earlier a synonym  of “existent”, as the name of a subcat-
egory.7 The Earlier Grossmann8 has a top category of entities which 
is comprehensive. For the Later Grossmann the term “entity” refers 
to a variable which is what a variable symbol in a formalised sen-
tence stands for according to his view. 9 Since the sentence repre-
sents a fact a variable is a constituent of a fact and since there are 
constituents of facts which are not variables the category of entity in 
the later Grossmann cannot be the all-encompassing top category. 
Thus it seems that the Later Bergmann and the Later 
Grossmann are left with a categorial forest rather than with a tree of 
categories. Admittedly, the later Grossmann has again a maximally 
6. G. BERGMANN, Realism (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1967) 4.
7. G. BERGMANN, New Foundations for Ontology (University of Wisconsin Press, 
Madison, 1992) 56.
8. R. GROSSMANN, Ontological Reduction (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
1973) 178f.
9. R. GROSSMANN, The Existence of the World (Routledge, London and New York, 
1992) 107.
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comprehensive concept, that of an object of a mental act.10 But 
under this concept fall, according to Grossman, also non-existents 
and an ontological category comprises by defi nition only existents. 
Therefore, objects cannot play the role of top of a categorial tree.
 4. THE MAXIMAL DIVISION
The more important issue is the maximal division, more precisely, 
the maximal categorial division. It is the question where to draw 
the line in a Porphyrian tree between the lowest categorial divi-
sion and the next lower division which is not categorial. Remember 
the remark above that only the highest vertices of the Porphyrian 
tree are occupied by categories. So, one has to draw the boundary 
somewhere between the categorial and the non-categorial. We will 
see that there is a good reason to draw such a boundary at a certain 
level and thus to distinguish the lowest subcategories from further 
specifi cations which are not subcategories. 
Porphyrius and Simplicius contrast their minimal division to 
the maximal division of Aristotle by which they refer to Aristotle’s 
ten categories of Categoriae. The term “maximal division” suggests 
that there is no fi ner division and that in Aristotle’s ontology there 
cannot be more subcategories than those ten. But there are, obvi-
ously, fi ner divisions and Aristotle is aware of them. The ten catego-
ries form just the top of a big Porphyrian tree the branches of which 
spread out to the most specifi c. The question arises therefore why 
to make the cut where Aristotle does make it and how to decide that 
what is at lower vertices of the tree are not categories. The answer 
given by Aristotle’s commentators is semantical, namely, that the 
ten categories are suffi cient to explain the meaning of all sentence 
parts which have a representative role. Now, one may doubt the 
congruence of ontology and semantics implied by the answer but it 
can be interpreted also as the claim that the ten categories are suf-
fi cient to analyse all elementary and ubiquitous phenomena, which 
are the domain of ontology. 
10. Ibidem, 114.
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That answer is legitimate although rather unspecifi c and 
global. It amounts merely to the claim that Aristotle’s ten-category-
ontology is on the whole successful and adequate. A more specifi c 
and more decidable answer can be given for ontologies with facts 
as complexes having constituents of different categories. There are 
rules of combination in this ontology, which are based on ontologi-
cal categories. They determine which entities form together facts 
depending on their category. The maximal division can be defi ned 
as comprising all the categories which occur in the rules of combina-
tion for the facts. 
Consider an ontology with the categories of particulars, uni-
versals, and facts consisting of particulars and universals. That the 
division of the highest category of existents into particulars, univer-
sals, and facts cannot be the maximal division is shown by looking at 
the rules of combinations into facts. There is no combination rule 
according to which a particular and a universal form a fact together. 
Rather a subcategory of the category of universals is needed. The 
pertinent rule determines that a particular and a non-relational uni-
versal of the fi rst order combine into a fact. Hence, the categories 
of particular and non-relational universal of the fi rst order belong 
to the maximal division and are lowest categories while the category 
of universal is not one of the lowest categories. 
5. CATEGORY AND CATEGORIAL ESSENCE11
What makes a substance, for example, a substance? What makes 
something a member of a certain ontological category? What 
grounds category membership ontologically? The explications of 
the fi rst paragraph suggest that the membership is based on hav-
11. See also E. TEGTMEIER, Categories and Categorial Entities, in J. CUMPA , E. 
TEGTMEIER (eds.), Ontological Categories (Ontos , Frankfurt, 2011), where I use 
the term “categorial entity” rather than “categorial essence”. The problem of 
categorial essences has be discovered in recent times by Gustav Bergmann who 
explained it in his paper Ineffability, Ontology, and Method (1960) republished 
in G. BERGMANN, Logic and Reality (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 
1964). Bergmann does not bother about categorial essences for all his categories 
and about their compatibility.
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ing a certain property. However, that does not seem to accord with 
the traditional Aristotelian view. Aristotle answers that this man is 
a substance because he is a man and because a man is a substance. 
It would not be correct to say that according to Aristotle being a 
man entails being a substance. Aristotle does not accept being a 
substance as a distinct property rather he considers it as mere ab-
straction, as was mentioned already. I would argue that abstraction 
is an epistemological concept and that category membership needs 
an ontological ground. To explain how we grasp a certain attribute 
does not answer the question what that attribute is.
The ontological grounds of category membership I advocate 
are specifi c properties which could be called “categorial essences”. 
The concept of essence is, of course, adopted from Aristotle, namely 
from Metaphysica Z. But it is modifi ed. In Aristotle humanness (what 
it is to be a human) is an example of an essence while it would not 
be a categorial essence. What it is to be an accident (call it acciden-
tality) and what it is to be a particular (particularity) would serve 
as examples of categorial essences if Aristotle countenanced such 
essences. Compared to Aristotle’s essences which are specifi c, cat-
egorial essences seem rather unspecifi c. That is not astonishing 
since the categorial essences are not placed at the bottom of the 
Porphyrian Tree like Aristotelian essences but at its top. 
With categorial essences a diffi culty arises similar to the one 
discussed above concerning the cut between the lowest categories 
and the lower region the Porphyrian Tree. This time it is not the 
diffi culty to justify the level at which the cut is placed but rather to 
make sense of the difference between categorial essences and the 
normal properties of the lower region. It is a diffi culty because of 
the continuity between categorial and normal properties in the edge 
chains of the all-encompassing Porphyrian tree. Assuming such a 
tree, the property carmine, for example, is considered to be a speci-
fi cation of the property red and the property of a red a specifi cation 
of the property of colour and the property of colour to be a specifi -
cation of the property of property. 
The ontology I advocated offers a solution of the diffi culty. 
According to it there is not the all-encompassing Porphyrian Tree 
of properties but only such a tree of classes determined by our con-
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cepts, not by properties in a specifi cation chain. I would claim that 
“red” does not represent a property but only a similarity class and 
that “colour” is not in that specifi cation chain at all because it is not 
a property of material objects like the property carmine but a prop-
erty of properties, for example of the property of carmine. Carmine 
has the property of being a colour. Thus in my view there is no 
long edge chain from the categories to the lowest vertices of the all-
encompassing Porphyrian tree. Rather, the categories face only the 
lowest vertices as far as the properties are concerned. Thus there is a 
natural trench between them, so to speak. It is a consequence of the 
existence of properties of properties which is assumed in the ontol-
ogy with facts. It may be suspected to be incommensurate with the 
demand for a unitary categorial tree made above. But that demand 
is related to a unitary theory of categories and to a limited domain 
while the all-encompassing Porphyrian tree covers a rather inhomo-
geneous and very large domain.
Essences in Aristotle’s Metaphysica such as being a man are 
very closely related to the particulars of which they are essences. 
Some of Aristotle’s statements in Metaphysica suggest even that both 
coincide which would imply that essences are tropes. Categorial es-
sences as here assumed are also closely related to the existents which 
thereby belong to exactly one category. They are more closely re-
lated than ordinary properties and in such a way that they become 
inseparable. They are connected in such a way that it is impossible 
for them not to be connected to the existent to which they are 
connected. This ontological analysis of the connection of catego-
rial essences captures the phenomenon of the necessity of category 
memberships and the equivalent impossibility of alternative cate-
gory memberships. Notice that in Aristotelianism it is mostly taken 
for granted that a substance cannot change into an accident and that 
an accident cannot change into a substance in spite of substantial 
changes on a more specifi c level.
6. THE DIFFICULTY OF MULTIPLE CATEGORY MEMBERSHIP
In Aristotle it is not only clear that the essence cannot get lost and 
cannot change but also that an existent cannot have two different 
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essences. Correspondingly for the ontology with categorial essences 
I advocate it holds that no existent has two categorial essences. I 
would advance two arguments against the admission of more than 
one category of an existent: Firstly, the very close relationship 
between categorial essence and the categorised existent seems to 
exclude more than one categorial essence. Secondly, if there were 
categorial essences for a category as well as for its subcategories, 
they would get in each other’s way and the higher categorial essence 
would seem superfl uous, as for example when one attributes the 
categorial essence of being an accident and also of being a quality. 
It is as odd as describing an object as red and carmine.
The diffi culty arises because any existent which belongs to 
a subcategory also belongs to the superordinate categories and if 
each category would be determined by a categorial essence existents 
would have several categorial essences. That is what we excluded. 12
How to solve the diffi culty? In my view it is out of the ques-
tion to give up the maximal division in favour of as lesser division 
because the categories involved are necessary for the categorial rules 
of combination. Moreover, the diffi culty would remain as long as 
there were any subcategories. Hence it would be solved only if one 
fell back to the highest category. But a one-category ontology with 
no subcategories would hardly furnish adequate ontological analyses 
of all ontologically relevant phenomena. However, to keep only the 
lowest subcategories and drop the higher category would take away 
the unity of the Porphyrian tree, in fact, turn it into a graph which 
would not be a tree since it would eliminate the highest vortex (the 
highest category). Instead of a tree there would be only a forest of 
separate trees.
12. In Grossmann’s ontology that is not excluded because he considers categorial 
essences as normal universals which are external to the entity which exemplifi es 
it. All properties are likewise connected by the relation of exemplifi cation to the 
property owners. See R. GROSSMANN, Ontological Reduction, cit., 143f. However, 
in Grossmann analysis the necessity of categorial essences is lost. Bergmann 
does not realise the diffi culty. He thinks he can get along with just the categorial 
essences of particularity and universality See: G. BERGMANN, Realism cit., 70. 
Bergmann’s categorial essences are internal.
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7. CATEGORIES WITHOUT CATEGORIAL ESSENCES
There seems to be only one way out, namely to accept categories 
which are not determined by categorial essences. Only the lowest 
subcategories can be taken to be determined by such essences while 
the higher categories must be taken to be determined in another 
way. The lowest subcategories take priority because their categorial 
essences are required for the ontological laws of combination, as was 
indicated already.
How then are the higher subcategories and the highest cat-
egory determined? Not by simple properties or short conjunctions 
of such but by more complicated properties which take into account 
many situations of the members of the respective categories. Let us 
call those complicated properties “categorial criteria”. Categorial 
criteria descend mostly from Parmenides’ signs of being. Look for 
example at Aristotle’s criteria of a substance (ousia) in Metaphysica 
Z. Being simple and being independent and being identifi able (tode 
ti). In Categoriae Aristotle characterises a substance as independent 
but an accident as dependent. In my ontology things which belong 
either to the subcategory of particulars or to the subcategory of 
universals are characterised as simple. The category of things is con-
trasted with the category of facts which are complexes. However, 
being simple and being complex are not considered to be simple or 
conjunctive universals. Similarly, in Aristotle being independent and 
dependent are not considered to be accidents. 
However, it seems that Aristotle tends to characterise also the 
categories of the maximal division in terms of categorial criteria. 
Relations, for example, are described as accidents which least satisfy 
the criteria of a proper being.13 
13. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysica 1088a.
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8. SPECIFICATION AND ABSTRACTION
There is an implicit alternative solution of the diffi culty of multi-
ple category membership which can be attributed to Aristotle.14 He 
starts from the observation that the more specifi c property contains 
in some sense the less specifi c ones up to the least specifi c which 
suggests that the specifi cation suffi ces and grounds all upper prop-
erties it specifi es. Hence one can confi ne oneself to the maximally 
specifi ed (species specialissimae) and yet have the ontological grounds 
for all upper properties. When Aristotle says that the upper proper-
ties of a Porphyrian Tree are contained in the lower ones he does 
not mean that the lower properties are complex and composed of 
the higher ones. Rather he holds the properties (more precisely, 
the essence of a substance which is identical with that substance) to 
be simple. It is only the defi nition of the property which has parts. 
Aristotle conceives of the containedness of the upper properties in 
epistemological terms. We can apprehend the upper properties by 
apprehending the lower ones in an indeterminate way. Aristotle as-
sumes that we arrive at the property of being a substance (ousia) by 
apprehending a more specifi c property in a maximally indetermi-
nate way. That can be understood as a kind of abstraction. My ob-
jection to this view is again that the problem is ontological whereas 
Aristotle’s solution is epistemological and therefore not adequate. 
Nevertheless, the view could be the reason why the problem has not 
been noticed in the tradition.
9. RESULTS
From a graph-theoretical point of view the minimal division is prob-
lematic as top of the categorial hierarchy because it prevents unity 
in the sense of connectedness and produces a categorial forest rather 
than a categorial tree. However, the Later Aristotle offers also a 
categorial hierarchy which is a tree after all. A confl ict between 
the minimal and the maximal division of Aristotle and in general 
14. See F. BRENTANO, Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung (Quelle& Mayer, Heidel-
berg, 1911) 18f.
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between upper categories and subcategories surfaces when simple 
categorial essences are assumed which determine the membership 
in categories. It can be resolved by restricting such essences to the 
lowest subcategories (the maximal division). That entails a differ-
ence between the way the lowest and the higher categories are de-
termined. It is argued that the lowest subcategories are determined 
by simple categorial essences as those essences are needed for on-
tological laws of composition. The other categories are determined 
only loosely by certain criteria which are not reducible to simple 
essences. By means of this contrast the minimal and the maximal 
contrast become compatible.
The need for subcategories and for a whole categorial tree was 
explained by the task of analysing categorially all elementary and 
ubiquitous phenomena and by the relationships of categories in the 
respective ontological theory.
The Aristotelian Tradition fi ts all existents into an all-encom-
passing Porphyrian Tree. It is pointed out that the borderline be-
tween the categorial upper part and the lower non-categorial part 
of that tree which coincides with the maximal division is not easy 
to justify and that fact ontologies with combinatorial laws are better 
off with respect to that problem. The latter ontologies imply also a 
more complicated structure with shorter and less continuous chains 
of specifi cation. They suggest that the traditional all-encompassing 
Porphyrian tree may be too streamlined.
